ADDENDUM TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NUMBER: BC-2002-03160 COUNSEL: HEARING DESIRED: NO APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT: 1. Her Apr 94 involuntary release from her Active Duty for Support (ADS) orders be set aside. 2. She be granted retroactive sanctuary zone protection under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) § 12686(a) until she qualifies for a Regular retired pay in Apr 96. STATEMENT OF FACTS: A similar appeal was considered and denied by the Board on 3 Sep 03. For an accounting of the facts and circumstances surrounding the applicant’s separation, and, the rationale of the earlier decision by the Board, see the Record of Proceedings at Exhibit I. By DD Form 149, dated 15 Feb 12, the applicant requests reconsideration to invoke protection under the sanctuary provisions because her ADS orders were unlawfully changed to Active Duty For Training (ADT) after-the-fact; thereby, denying her the ability to apply for sanctuary. Counsel provides an affidavit from the same Air Force civilian employee, who provided a statement in her 2003 application, in which he again contends the 2003 statement by the former Superintendent, Consolidated Base Personnel Office (CBPO), was false. Further, his affidavit shows the alleged timing of the amendments as being after the applicant had left active duty status was not truthful. But, rather her orders were amended secretly being triggered by her inquiries about sanctuary while she was still on her ADS tour. Counsel notes that her Air Force records and BCMR proceedings are complete and contains all the necessary contentions at issue. In addition, neither the applicant nor the Board raised the relevance and similarity in her case to Bond v. United States, where the court held that the Air Force unit violated its own regulation by retroactively changing a Reservists ADS orders to ADT in order to deny sanctuary. As well, the similarity in Wagner v. United States, 2004, where the court found the US Army improperly released a Reservist under its 18 year sanctuary rule without prior Secretarial approval, only speculating in hindsight that the SECARMY would have released the Reservist anyway. The applicant believes the Board should find it in the interest of justice to consider her untimely application because since 2000, she has been suffering from multiple degenerative diseases that has prevented her active pursuit of new evidence and this reconsideration. In addition, the applicant retained counsel, in 2008; however, in 2007, counsel was injured in an accident which counsel received extensive treatment and rehabilitation up until 2010. The applicant’s complete submission, with attachments, is at Exhibit J. AIR FORCE EVALUATION: AFRC/JAA recommends denial indicating the Board issue one or more of three, alternative findings, the first-shown finding here, in particular, being fully warranted based on all the evidence in this advisory: 1. On the merits, direct evidence written by the applicant herself in 1996 convincingly shows she did not make an affirmative claim for sanctuary zone protection while she was still serving on active duty, an essential element required to perfect a claim for sanctuary zone protection. Therefore, her application should be denied. JAA need not reach the issue of whether the applicant's military duties she performed in Apr 94 were, in fact, ADS or ADT, as might otherwise be required based on Bond v. U.S…. 2. On new and relevant evidence, the applicant has submitted no newly-discovered credible evidence, not reasonably available when her application was previously considered by the Board and the evidence submitted is unfavorable. Therefore, her request for reconsideration should be denied for that reason. 3. On timeliness, her request is submitted 8 years, 4 months, and 21 days after the Board's 26 Sept 2003 decision on her initial request for relief, during which a key witness died and contains insufficient justification to explain her lengthy delay. Therefore, her request was not submitted within a reasonable time and should be denied for that reason. Pursuant to the Board’s request, four questions were identified that needed to be addressed by JAA over and above other portions of the advisory: In the first question to the Board, counsel cites (and partly misquotes) a Sep 96 version of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 65-109, Preparation of AF Form 938, the AF Form 938, Request and Authorization for Active Duty Training/ Active Duty Tour, which deals with preparing active duty orders for Reservists. What version of the AFI, or what other authority existed during the relevant period (spring 1994)? JAA notes this question refers to the applicant’s request for reconsideration, which misquotes the 1996-issued AFI 61-109, and its para 1.4., including sub para 1.4.9. However, JAA was unsuccessful locating any version of AFI 65-109 (or any other written publication or written policy covering its subject matter) that was in effect in Apr-May 94, the timeframe at issue. Nonetheless, JAA confirms or concedes here without hesitation that even in the absence of a written policy or a published instruction in effect in Apr/May 94, the substance of this 1996 AFI’s paragraphs very likely existed and surely controlled in Apr 94, in practice, merely as a matter of both logic and law. However, a few words of background are required to explain their belief and to provide necessary context. The Board will recall that to "perfect" Sanctuary Zone (SZ) claim, two elements must occur: a. The member must make an affirmative claim to the statute's protection, in order to show that any subsequent release from non-ADT active duty without SAF approval was "involuntary"; and, b. At the time of the member's affirmative claim to sanctuary protection, the member must then be "on active duty (other than for training.)" That is to say, a sanctuary claim made by a Reservist "in the zone" who serves non-ADT active duty, but made prior to entering on that non-ADT active duty or made after the Reservist's release therefrom is unavailing. (Emphasis added.) Simply put, a member who seeks sanctuary zone protection must, in fact, be performing duties that constitute ADS and, while still performing those ADS duties, the member must then affirmatively assert a claim for sanctuary zone protection. It avails the member nothing to claim sanctuary zone protection after being released from active duty. In light of these two sanctuary zone requirements, the substance of the above-shown AFI provisions makes perfect sense, whether published in writing in Apr 94 or not. In summary, the two principles stated in AFI 65-109's para 1.4.9. permit an amendment to military orders when the duties to be performed or actually performed are/were ADT duties, but the original order erroneously stated "ADS" or erroneously stated a corresponding ADS TCC; and, they bar an amendment to active duty orders when the duties performed are/were, in fact, ADS duties and the orders correctly state "ADS" (or the corresponding TCC.) JAA also believes that even in the absence of any applicable written policy in Apr 94, both principles necessarily would have applied in Apr-May 94, since each principle, respectively, permits or prohibits an amendment to an active duty order when the amendment would correct a demonstrable publishing error or would create a falsehood. Finally in this case, JAA believes it's important to recall that the 2002-2003 dispositive issue centered on whether or not the applicant had made "a timely claim" for sanctuary zone protection. In terms of the elements required to perfect a sanctuary zone claim (re-stated above, from our 2003 advisory), the key questions addressed by JAA and by HQ USAF/JAG in 2003 were: - Did the applicant "make an affirmative claim to the statute's protection" in Apr-May 94?; and, - If so, “at the time of the applicant's affirmative claim to sanctuary protection,” was the applicant then “on active duty (other than for training);” that is, was the applicant then performing ADS duties, or had she previously been released from active duty? The Board’s 25 Jan 13 request to JAA states, "In the original [2002] application, an important question of fact was whether the applicant invoked the sanctuary protections of 10 USC 12686 while on orders, as she claimed, or whether she only did so after the orders expired.” (Emphasis added.) The Board's 2003 decision in this case concluded, "[We] do not find the applicant's assertions or the documentation presented in support of her appeal sufficiently persuasive to override the rationale provided by the Air Force Offices or Primary Responsibility (OPRs); and, "the applicant has failed to sustain her burden …." It's apparent the Board concluded this applicant had not shown she made a sanctuary zone claim while she was still serving on active duty. The Board’s Second Question: Counsel for the applicant also references Volume 2 of Air Force Regulation (AFR) 35-41, which defines ADT and ADS. What version of the regulation was in effect during the relevant period? What were its provisions on ADT and ADS?": JAA notes they were successful in locating a copy of AFR 35-41, Volume 2, Reserve Personnel Policy Reserve Training, issued on 1 May 92 and have included it with this advisory. (Attachment 1.) The terms "ADT" and "ADS," appear in various locations throughout that 1992-issued AFR. However, their examination disclosed no occurrences of those terms or their acronyms that have any relevance to the applicant’s request, except for that regulation's paragraph 6-8, excerpted here: 6-8. Special Tours of ADT and ADS: a. Special tours of ADT may be used to maintain or increase the member's mobilization readiness in support of reserve needs. Authorized ADT must provide a primary training content to the member during tours involving organized and planned specialized skill training, flight training, combat crew training, unit conversion training, refresher and proficiency training, officer acquisition training, professional development education programs, etc. b. Special tours of ADS may be used for projects that directly support Reserve component programs (located at active or Reserve component agencies) in which training for the member is not the primary objective, but a significant outcome. ADS projects include annual screening, unit conversions to new weapons systems, projects supporting study groups, training sites and exercises, short-term mission projects, administrative support functions, conferences, and staff visits. c. Commander or their designated representatives have the authority to determine the appropriate Training Category Code (TCC) to be used for ADT and ADS tours and must make sure appropriate TCCs are placed in all ADT and ADS orders. The same, above-quoted "para 6-8" from the same 1992-issued AFR 35-41, Vol. 2 was quoted as shown here, in the United States Court of Federal Claims decision Bond v. U.S., 47 Fed.Cl. at Footnote 8, p. 649 (2000}, a decision that addressed an Air Force Reserve officer's sanctuary zone claim. A copy of that decision was included with the applicant's request for reconsideration. The Board’s Third Question: Counsel also cites a federal court case, Bond v. U.S., 47 Fed.Cl. 641 (2000). In Bond, one of the points of contention involved the nature of active service performed by a reservist. According to the court, the test for determining whether such service should count for sanctuary purposes is the actual nature of the service performed, not command's administrative description of such service. How does AFRC/JA interpret this holding and its applicability to the present reconsideration? JAA agrees the Bond decision of 12 Sep 00 declared, in effect (using their words, rather than quoting the court), "the words 'Active Duty for Training,' or the acronym 'ADT', or the corresponding ADT TCC found on an active duty order are not controlling, if the substance of the military duties performed is convincingly shown to be 'Active Duty for Support'." However, the Bond decision has no direct application to the applicant’s request for at least three reasons. First and foremost, the Bond court applicant to this same Board (who subsequently became the Plaintiff before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims) had unquestionably made an affirmative claim for sanctuary zone protection and he had done so while serving on active duty (which the court ultimately determined to be ADS), meeting the "timeliness" requirement necessary to perfect his sanctuary zone claim. In stark contrast to the Bond facts, the dispositive questions addressed in this applicant's case have always been and remain, "Did this applicant make any claim for sanctuary zone protection and if so, did she do so while she was still performing active duty and not thereafter?" It follows that the Bond decision has no application to this request because the Bond case did not concern itself with the key issue that's present in this request: "Did this applicant make an affirmative sanctuary zone claim while the applicant was still serving on active duty?" Only if and when evidence shows the answer to that question to be "Yes" would the additional issues addressed in Bond be relevant at all to this applicant (that is, "Was the active duty served by this applicant ADS?") The nature of the active duty performed by this applicant (ADT or ADS) is irrelevant if she made no sanctuary zone claim at all or if she only made a sanctuary zone claim after she was released from active duty. Second, in Bond, the applicant received active duty orders that were nominally labeled ADT, when the actual purpose of his active duty was; to complete a Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP) alert tour beginning 20 Dec 92 and ending 21 Dec 92. Again in stark contrast, when addressing this applicant neither JAA nor HQ USAF/JAG in our prior advisories ever reached the issue of whether the military duties performed by this applicant were, in fact, ADS duties or were ADT duties (“with ‘primary training content’ as part of the duty.)” Instead, both advisories only focused on whether or not this applicant asserted a sanctuary zone claim at all and, if she did, whether or not she did so "while serving" on active duty -- the “timing element" required to perfect a sanctuary zone claim. The Board concluded in 2003 the applicant's evidence was not "sufficiently persuasive to override the rationale provided by the OPRs." It's apparent the Board concluded either the applicant had not shown she'd made an affirmative sanctuary zone claim at all; or, if she did, her sanctuary zone claim was not made "while she was serving on active duty," but was made thereafter. In either case, no assertions were made in the provided advisories (and no findings were made by the Board) concerning whether the active duty performed by this applicant was, in fact, ADS or was ADT. That issue remains unaddressed, so Bond is of no help to this applicant, not yet, not until and unless the evidence shows she made a sanctuary zone claim while still serving on active duty. Third, this Board (as opposed to the court) in the Bond matter had concluded, "that he was not in the proper duty category ADS to apply for sanctuary status, and … unit commanders have the discretion to characterize duty as either ADT or ADS," denying his application because his orders stated "Special ADT." Of course, the court in Bond denied that degree of discretion to unit commanders, concluding as to the applicant’s "SIOP alert" flying duty that its, "primary content and purpose was to support the active duty mission -- not to conduct reserve training"; and, "SIOP alert duty is 'normally considered' an active duty support mission;" and, "SIOP duty … was never considered an ADT type mission." Our point is any precedential value the Bond decision may have on whether certain active duty performed is ADS or is ADT is limited to "SIOP alert duty," obviously not remotely related to the "Recruiting Support" purpose reflected on each of the applicant's Apr 94 active duty orders, including her final 1994 active duty order that ran from 18 - 22 Apr 94. So, Bond is also not relevant on whether this applicant's duties performed in Apr 94 were ADS duties, since they were certainly not "SIOP' alert" flying duties. In sum, Bond would only become relevant to this request when and if this applicant submits evidence showing she made an affirmative claim to sanctuary zone protection; and, she did so while actually serving on active duty. The prior advisories asserted this applicant had not made that showing and the Board's 2003 decision in the applicant's case concurred with both advisories on that point. Until this applicant makes that showing to the Board's satisfaction, any inquiry into whether the active duty she served was, in fact, ADT or was ADS (as required by the Bond decision) is unnecessary, because her claim to sanctuary zone protection must fail solely because she cannot show she actually made a sanctuary zone claim “while she was still serving on active duty.” The Board Fourth Question: Besides the authorities cited above, what (if any) regulatory, statutory, or case law provisions would have applied in the relevant period? JAA has been unsuccessful in locating published references in effect in Apr-May 94 that have not been referred to previously. However, there is one sense in which the Bond decision may be of some limited use to the Board. All the factual events described in Bond occurred in Dec 92. In the absence of contradictory authorities (and we've found none), it's a reasonable conclusion Air Force sanctuary zone policies referred to in Bond, deemed applicable to Bond's Dec 92 events, would also have been applicable 17 months later, when the Apr-May 94 events involving this applicant occurred. JAA is unaware of any alterations to Air Force sanctuary zone policies that occurred during the Dec 92 –to - Apr/May 94 timeframe. Thus, JAA believes the Board may reasonably conclude Bond's references to sanctuary zone policies applicable to him in 1992 also would have applied to this applicant later, in Apr-May 94. For that reason, there's been no need to determine whether the active duty this applicant served was, in fact, ADS or was ADT and it follows that many of the regulatory authorities quoted in Bond defining ADT and ADS remain irrelevant to this request. Nonetheless, Bond does contain references to an applicable Air Force sanctuary zone "policy" that will be shown later is relevant to this application. As the Bond court noted, in 1992 (and very likely thereafter, in Apr-May 94), "Air Force policy restricted Reservists near the sanctuary zone, i.e., those close to or with 18 or more years of active duty service, from receiving ADS tours without prior approval." The same Air Force "policy" on sanctuary zone was reaffirmed by the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) in its advisory submitted in the Bond case. "Regarding question one, ARPC/JA responded that prior approval of HQ USAF was required to permit a Reservist to voluntarily enter the sanctuary zone.” In addition, the applicant's own words, written by her much closer in time (in 1996) to the Apr-May 94 events than any other documents she authored and submitted to the Board, flatly contradict the assertions she made in her 2002 Application for Correction and in her 2012 request for reconsideration, compelling the Board, in our view, to deny her request -- on the merits. The reliability (credibility) of the applicant's memory in her 2002 application (eight years after the fact) and in her 2012 request for reconsideration (18 years after the fact) is called into serious question, in light of the words she used in her two 1996 letters to her Congressman. Her 1996 words are entitled to far more weight because: (1) written closer in time (in 1996) to the 1994 events, when memory is clearer than it would be years later; and, (2) their content obviously undercuts the applicant's ultimate goal and, thus, should be viewed by the Board as "against her interests", therefore far more candid than later-made, contradictory assertions; and, (3) it's also fair to assume when a constituent writes to a Congressman, the constituent would likely conclude a Member of Congress can and will access the truth, motivating the constituent to take greater care when writing such a letter. JAA goes on to explain reasons why the applicant’s request should be denied based on timeliness and newly discovered relevant evidence that was previously available to the Board. A complete JAA evaluation, with attachments, is at Exhibit K. APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION: On 11 Apr 13, the application was administratively closed at counsel’s request (Exhibit M). On 17 Dec 13, the counsel requested the application be reopened. Counsel refutes almost all of the opinions noted in almost 50 pages long- 27 pages, single-spaced legal opinion, with 20 pages of exhibits. Counsel notes after reading this 2013 advisory opinion and exhibits, the only purpose of such absurd length is to overwhelm the AFBCMR by throwing up a grab-bag of every trivial and nitpicky argument. The other purpose of this machine-gun spray in every direction - is to obscure the indisputable facts in the case, and the legal issues they raise- the applicant's inquiries about sanctuary during her last ADS tour prompted the unit tour to illegally change the orders to ADT during that last tour, then the unit refused to sign (certify) her original ADS orders. One such distracting smoke-screen is the condescending 3-page lecture on the technical points of English grammar and syntax, along with a 6-page "Attachment 3" showing proper usage. This lecture presumes the applicant's case fails by her not using proper English etiquette in articulating her claim. The 2013 advisory opinion keeps referring to one collateral letter written (without counsel) in 1996 to her congressman-while ignoring the underlying suspect orders, and what she submitted to the BCMR in 2002 and 2003. In addition to pro se before her Congressman and to BCMR, she did not possess a college degree, but an airman. Court case law on BCMR adjudications, citing the Supreme Court, say that when it is not explicitly clear that a certain claim was raised … as long as there is some evidence to suggest that he did * * * the [BCMR] agency must take pains to protect the rights of pro se parties against the consequences of technical errors. Calloway v. Brownlee. Secretary of Army, 366 F.Supp.2d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2005)[emphasis added]. But here, the BCMR and advisory opinion take great pains to erect a hyper technical barrier on a pro se applicant's grammar. This blinded the agency from looking deeper at the suspect orders, amendments, and other evidence. It is linguistically sufficient to "suggest" a sanctuary claim when the applicant said to the BCMR in her 24 Mar 03 letter "I tried to acquire Sanctuary in Apr 94 through the [unit]." Her 26 Sept 02, BCMR letter states that prior to end of ADS duty she "couldn't get my orders signed, that's when I started asking questions [to various officials whom I could go to get sanctuary]." This evidence, along with the switched ADS orders to ADT during the tour - confirm the unit was prompted by the applicant's inquiries to perfect her sanctuary claim. So that is why they refused to sign/certify the original orders (AF Form 938). Another phony argument is an alleged 'key witness' to rebut the new affidavit, but such witness is now deceased (former recruiting Chief). This is another phony distraction. This is not new evidence presented in 2012, rather, a reiteration that part of what he said on 25 Sep 02- then stating that once the recruiting chief found the applicant could claim sanctuary, every effort was made to change her duty status. The witness’s testimony in 2012, simply repeats this in paragraph 5's opening sentence as background. So the 2013 Advisory Opinion's argument is suspect since the former recruiting Chief in 2002 was not interviewed then in the applicant’s claim involving the affidavit. In 2004, this new evidence, with these additional details was provided to the applicant; however, due to her health problems, she was unable to appeal. The new affidavit goes on to note that during 1994 ADS duty, he learned from others in the unit the applicant was asking questions to request sanctuary because her superiors would not help her. He also recalls that the applicant told him at the time that she had been asked to pick up her amendments before the tour ended. Moreover, the amendment shows they were issued/approved on 19 April during the applicant's last ADS duty (18 -22 April). There is nothing to dispute. The 2012 affidavit was replied to in 2013 by the only relevant witness, former CBPO Superintendent, as his new sworn statement. First, what he says is not credible. But what is more important is the manner in which the 2013 statement was prepared. He admits he was asked to write a statement after rereading portions of his 2002 statement within the narrative context of entire 2013 advisory opinion-representing the position of the Air Force Reserve on the new evidence. His statement would be credible if he had simply reread his 2002 statement then 2012 affidavit alone. This suggests not only the questionable legal ethics of the author of the 2013 advisory opinion, but taints its overall reliability. The advisory opinion also wants the BCMR to rigidly apply formal MSPB adjudicatory standards requiring mental incompetence as necessary to justify the applicant’s 8 year reconsideration delay from the 2004 BCMR decision. The opinion implies that it is not enough to excuse the delay even for a near invalid with debilitating Multiple Sclerosis (MS) disease of wasting muscles with cataracts and heart abnormalities, and co-morbid diabetes, and spinal arthritis. Court case law on BCMR adjudications, citing the Supreme Court, says that the relation of the military to its members must be like a compassionate friendly uncle to look beyond nit-picky details- The 2013 advisory opinion sidesteps her new claim on the merits. For example, the questions begged by refusal of her unit to sign her AF Form 938 during her last ADS tour. This confirms the veracity of the applicant's inquiries at that time to claim sanctuary had prompted the unit to quickly substitute ADT amendments during the last tour. The former CBPO Superintendent admits that the unit had inadvertently allowed the applicant to enter sanctuary to perform legitimate ADS duties. But 'inadvertence' and amendments are irrelevant. The former CBPO Superintendent and the unit dodge this arguing that amendment was long after ADS tours were completed to prevent opportunities to request retention. This is false. The next issue ignored is the 2003 BCMR erroneously agreed with him that no one knew- not even the applicant - during her ADS tours that she was in Sanctuary, and thus "her three sets of orders were amended after-the-fact." But there is nothing in the record that supports this. First, why then does her ADS order (previously approved by the command) not contain a certifying signature that it was completed? Second, neither advisory opinion in 2003 or 2012 provides a copy of the AF Form 938 orders signed. Nor have they provided any other explanation. She was not AWOL. Any airman, particularly an NCO, would start asking questions for a unit refusing to certify an approved AF Form 938, to not only accrue points, but to get paid. Even the current AFRC guides require that this AF Form 938 must be certified to receive payment from the Reserve Pay Office (RPO). Thirdly, the amendment from ADS to ADT was "issued and approved" on 19 Apr 94 during her last ADS tour (18-22 April). (AF IMT 973 Change of Administrative Orders, signed 19 Apr 94 by "issuing/approving official...,"); and see the Affidavit, where the applicant’s orders were secretly amended to ADT during the last duty period when word spread that she was asking everyone about trying to claim sanctuary; attempt to withhold her the amendment until after her duty was completed). Fourth, the record flatly contradicts the assertion that no one knew during the applicant's ADS tours that she was in sanctuary, and thus her orders were amended after-the-fact." The change to the ADS orders was reversed during the tour when prompted by her red-flag inquiries throughout the unit for someone to sign the original AF Form 938 orders. The only thing after- the-fact was the routine housekeeping "authentication" stamp on 3 May 94 to the AF Form 973 already approved locally on 19 Apr. This is a case of an AF reserve unit-similar to that in Bond - that manipulated ADS records then went beyond to actively obstruct an airman's efforts to receive sanctuary retirement. The case is tragic in that in 2003 the applicant was a disabled pro se applicant, without college degree. These factors further hindered adequate case presentation before the AFBCMR. The classic duplicity of revoking previously approved benefits after reaching 18 years active duty was condemned in Bond, and analogous in Wagner. In the applicant's case, the record's contradiction of the unit's self-serving allegations are why the 2013 advisory opinion became apoplectic to reply with 50 pages to overwhelm the BCMR through irrelevant, convoluted legalese. It is also a disservice and waste of resources for the BCMR and staff to pour through this distracting drivel. Counsel’s complete response, with attachments, is at Exhibit N. THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT: 1. The applicant has exhausted all remedies provided by existing law or regulations. 2. The application was not timely filed; however, it is in the interest of justice to excuse the failure to timely file. 3. In earlier findings, the Board determined there was insufficient evidence to warrant corrective action. We have reviewed the additional documentation provided by the applicant and counsel, including the affidavit from the same witness who provided a statement in the 2003 application; however, considering this matter again, we do not find the evidence provided overcomes the rationale expressed in the previous board decision or that the previous decision should be reversed. While the applicant and counsel has provided additional arguments and court cases which in their view are similar in context to the applicant’s, in our view, the applicant has not presented substantial evidence that she has been the victim of an error or injustice. In this respect, we note aside from what counsel calls distracting drivel, as pointed out by JAA, we find it is more likely than not that the applicant failed to invoke sanctuary while on orders, no matter which type of orders they may have been. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we find no basis to recommend granting the requested relief. THE BOARD DETERMINES THAT: The applicant be notified the evidence presented did not demonstrate the existence of material error or injustice; the application was denied without a personal appearance; and the application will only be reconsidered upon the submission of newly discovered relevant evidence not considered with this application. The following members of the Board considered AFBCMR Docket Number BC-2002-03160 in Executive Session on 26 Feb 15 under the provisions of AFI 36-2603: , Panel Chair , Member , Member The following documentary evidence was considered: Exhibit I. Record of Proceedings, dated 26 Sep 03. Exhibit J. DD Form 149, dated 15 Feb 12, w/atchs. Exhibit K. Letter, AFRC/JA, dated 13 Mar 13, w/atchs. Exhibit L. Letter, SAF/MRBR, dated 21 Mar 13. Exhibit M. Letter, AFBCMR, dated 11 Apr 13. Exhibit N. Letter, Counsel, dated 3 Dec 13, w/atchs.